Taking the Matter Seriously, Part I

How Hylomorphism is Incongruous within a Latter-day Saint Paradigm

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The following is a response to Michael Ferguson's article in Wayfare Magazine entitled Spiritual Matter: Joseph Smith's Hylomorphic Theology. Please read that article for context:

The Good:

I'll begin by saying that, because of my background in music, I enjoyed Dr. Ferguson's allusions to it:

Think carefully about the nature and qualities of music. Ultimately, music is highly-structured vibration of air. Can music be beautiful? Of course! Can music be spiritual? Yes, music can be profoundly spiritual...The beauty and spirituality of music are represented to us in the highly and delicately structured nature of the vibratory patterns that physically infuse the air around us. This fact may seem trivially simple, yet its depth and meaning are worth contemplation. Music, in all its richness, spirituality, and potency to motivate goodness itself, is matter that has been made more fine or pure. 

Ferguson, Spiritual Matter

This is indeed an interesting idea, a play on what it means for matter to be "more fine or pure." I am personally interested in aesthetics, and I'll have to do a little more thinking on it. I might even get to it later in this piece.

Another good, though I would say related to the above, is the engagement in philosophy from a Latter-day Saint paradigm. That said, the bulk of this critique will be on ambiguity and/or misunderstandings of both LDS theology as such--especially with regard to what Joseph Smith taught--and philosophy generally. I take this charitably as being mostly oversight due to limited space and perhaps a similar stricture on time; the article isn't terribly long. Had Dr. Ferguson spent a little more time with the issue and the sources of his assertions, I'm sure he would have treated them more responsibly.

I do want to give credit to Dr. Ferguson as he is much-published and obviously accomplished in his field as an instructor at Harvard Medical School and a fellow at Harvard Divinity School. He has published in Neuroscience and gave a TEDx lecture entitled This is Your Brain on God. I'll readily admit I have significantly less experience than the good doctor, and with that offer a critique of his article Spiritual Matter published in Wayfare Magazine .

The Bad:

My critique will proceed along the following lines, so here's the synopsis up front:

1. Ferguson misunderstands and misrepresents the following points:

   • Hylomorphism

     • Aristotle's Matter and Form

       • The Prophetic Difference

       • Aristotelian Hylomorphism

       • Matter and Form as Causes

     • Aquinas' Hylomorphism (Thomistic)

       • Primer on Reading Aquinas

       • Quick Aside

       • Back to Thomas Aquinas

       • Thomistic Hylomorphism: Summa Part I, Q.76

   • Joseph Smith's statements on matter

     • Something of a Misrepresentation

I promise I will do my best to make this readable.

The Ugly:

Hylomorphism

Ferguson first defines the term as "...the insistence that in and through material being we encounter a transcendent reality that animates us with meaning...Simply put, a hylomorphic spirituality is one that takes special consideration for the form of matter, as opposed to divorcing spirit and matter."

He attributes hylomorphism, from the Greek ὕλη (hyle) which was first used as "wood," then commonly translated as "matter" after Aristotle started using it that way, and μορφή (morphē: "form") to Aristotle yet situates it in "spirituality." This definition of the term, I think, misunderstands the crux of the doctrine and also situates Ferguson in conversation with St. Thomas Aquinas, not Aristotle.

To start, the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, compiled by Simon Blackburn, defines hylomorphism thusly (emphasis mine): "The doctrine that every thing is a combination of matter and form. The doctrine was asserted by Aquinas, who possibly erroneously believed it to be Aristotelian."¹ Here we see Ferguson's focus and "special consideration for the form of matter," especially in a spiritual sense, is something different to what is described in philosophical hylomorphism. Far from just quibble definitions, though, I want to go to both Aristotle and Aquinas and see which fits most closely with Ferguson's framing.

Aristotle's Matter and Form

The Prophetic Difference

One thing that we need to be careful of when scrutinizing Joseph Smith or Aristotle is to clearly understand that, though both used the word matter--at least in our translations of the words--they can be speaking of different things entirely.

Joseph, for example, was no scholar, philosopher, or theologian. He was an inspired individual and prophet who didn't take much care in defining important terms. Take intelligence, for example. The field is wide open as to what he meant when talking about intelligences, and the discussion around that particular topic is fascinating (more on that later). Far from framing Joseph as an ignoramus, I do want to highlight that he was not trained in those kinds of rigorous studies. He was certainly a deep thinker as attested to by his mother:

Joseph continued to receive instructions from the Lord; and we, to get the children together every evening for the purpose of listening while he imparted the same to the family. I presume we presented an aspect as singular, as any family that ever lived upon the face of the Earth: all seated in a circle, father, mother, sons, and daughters, and giving the most profound attention to a boy, eighteen years of age, who had never read the Bible through in his life; for he was much less inclined to the perusals of books then any of the rest of our children, but far more given to meditation and deep study.

Lucy Mack Smith, History, 1845, p. 86-87, The Joseph Smith Papers, accessed April 24, 2023

And also noted in the Prophet's reaction to reading the verses in James 1:

Never did any passage of scripture come with more power to the heart of man than this did at this time to mine. It seemed to enter with great force into every feeling of my heart. I reflected on it again and again, knowing that if any person needed wisdom from God, I did; for how to act I did not know, and unless I could get more wisdom than I then had, I would never know...

Pearl of Great Price, Joseph Smith-History 1:12

Aristotle, on the other hand, was indeed a brilliant philosopher, the student of Plato.² One of the things that takes some getting used to is his somewhat obsessive preoccupation with defining and redefining and giving example after example for his terms. In this way we paradoxically get a better idea as well as (in my case) lose him on some ideas and definitions.

Aristotelian Hylomorphism

Aristotle's exposition of matter and form comes in his Physics, an 8-book treatise on so-called natural bodies: things which move and change, both living and non-living. We might profitably call it a treatise on the natural world. Aristotle begins in Book I by arguing that every thing which exists is made of two things: matter (also may be rendered substance or substratum, depending on the translation), and form (this one, for some reason, is consistent). To these terms Aristotle gives us a brief definition at the end of Book I:

(For my definition of matter is just this—the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be, and which persists in the result, not accidentally.) And if it ceases to be it will pass into that at the last, so it will have ceased to be before ceasing to be.
The accurate determination of the first principle in respect of form, whether it is one or many and what it is or what they are, is the province of first philosophy; so these questions may stand over till then.

Physics, 192a35-192b2, parenthesis in original

Aristotle is basically saying that the stuff (substratum) that makes up things is matter. He's not necessarily advocating our theory of molecules and atoms and other particles more subatomic, he's just saying that whatever stuff there is that makes up what we experience as a thing is called matter. And Aristotle's ideas on matter are that it is tied up in the form of it, which is not just the shape, but its way of being or nature:

The underlying nature can be known by analogy. For as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the formless before receiving form to anything which has form, so is the underlying nature to substance, i.e. the ‘this’ or existent.

Physics, 191a9-191a12

If the Statue of Liberty, for example, doesn't have bronze as its matter, then Aristotle would contend it isn't the statue that sits in New York Harbor. Likewise the wood in my bedroom isn't just kindling or a chair, it is my bedframe. Matter and form are tied to the things here and now, not a transcendent situation as Ferguson implies. For a more in-depth but readable primer, I feel like this Medium Article by Ryan Hubbard does a decent job.

What Ferguson terms as Aristotle's idea that "in and through material being we encounter a transcendent reality" seems more a Platonic, not an Aristotelian idea. Transcendent forms are an idea Plato through Socrates returns to over and over in any of the famous dialogues, take your pick. What is true is that Aristotle disagreed with his teacher, and Ferguson seems to agree more with the teacher than with the student. Though Aristotle does argue in Physics Book I, ch. 7 & 8 that his formulation of matter must be eternal based on motion and causes, he does not assign it any sort of so-called transcendence, and I'd be interested to know what Ferguson means by using that term. There's a reason Raphael's School of Athens depicts Plato pointing up and Aristotle gesturing to the ground.

Matter and Form as Causes

I also think it worth noting that Aristotle conceived of a form and matter as two of four causes or explanations for a thing's existence or nonexistence:

Now, the causes being four, it is the business of the student of nature to know about them all, and if he refers his problems back to all of them, he will assign the ‘why’ in the way proper to his science—the matter, the form, the mover, the that-for-the-sake-of-which.

Physics, 198a22-198a32

I don't think it important to go into all of the causes, just to note the point here so we can draw some distinctions later.

Aquinas' Hylomorphism (Thomistic)

Primer on Reading Aquinas

St. Thomas Aquinas did seem take up the Aristotelian paradigm of forms and matter in his questions as to the soul and body in the Summa theologiae, the exhaustive systematic theology spanning many questions written by Aquinas for theologically-minded Christians in Catholic practice. He presents his systematic reasoning in something similar to the following format (for those interested. If you aren't here's a video explaining the basics). I find this helpful if you don't have a lot of experience with Aquinas so I can refer you to specific parts of Aquinas' (or Thomistic, from his first name Thomas) Theology in the Summa:

• Question

  • In the Question, Aquinas lays out a specific questions in separate sections, or Articles, that he'll consider.

• Article

  • Objections

    • These are possible objections to the question at hand. They are not Aquinas' argument, rather the arguments he foresees opponents using to the proposed Article.

  • Sed Contra

    • Literally "On the Contrary", Aquinas usually quotes some authority which provides a partial rebuttal to the Objections

  • Respondeo

    • "I answer that," which is Aquinas' actual response and the heavy reading.

  • Replies to Objections

    • Aquinas then replies to each Objection given at the beginning of the Article.

Quick Aside

As an aside, just note that this is already much more formalized and organized than pretty much anything Joseph Smith ever wrote or received or transcribed as a revelation or statement. Not that some aren't organized, it's just that Joseph was not a formal theologian offering systematic views of "reality" or "religion" in the same way Aristotle and Aquinas may have done. Joseph received inspiration and transmitted it in a very different way.³

Back to Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas' Question 76 deals with the topic of the "Union of Body and Soul" in eight articles. The first thing to note as we come to the 76th Question of the Summa (which as an entire work contains 512 Questions, 2,669 Articles, and about 10,000 objections and replies, overall about 1.8 million words) is to note some bases upon which Aquinas is building his philosophy. They are important because they are directly opposed by the doctrines of the Restoration had in the Revelations through Joseph Smith. These include (with hyperlinked references if you want to go digging):

1. God is Simple, meaning He has no body or parts of His nature (Summa I, Q. 3 "Of the Simplicity of God"); the point being that matter cannot be an attribute of God, because anything which has matter implies a part.

2. God created ex nihilo, or literally brought everything out of nothing (Summa I, Q. 45 "Of the Mode of Emanation of Things from the First Principle"); the point being that everything, even people, are creations of God, and are therefore ontologically (in their way of being/existence) different from God.

3. The human soul/spirit is something which is incorporeal (bodiless) and subsistent (exists, but not necessarily in a material way) (Summa I, Q. 75 "Of Man who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance: and in the first place, concerning what belongs to the essence of the soul"); the point being that there is an immaterial cause which animates mankind, makes them move, think, feel, etc. Aquinas terms the soul as the intellectual principle in Article 6 of Question 75.

Thomistic Hylomorphism: Summa Part I, Q.76

Coming to the actual crux of Thomistic hylomorphism (the union of body and soul as causes), which is a we read in Question 76 "Of the Union of the Body and Soul." Article 1 treats specifically with the soul as the form of man. This Thomistic soul is not anything like what is given as a Revealed soul through Joseph Smith. In D&C 88:15 we get an explicit definition: "And the spirit and the body are the soul of man." I'm going to avoid the fascinating readings that can be had on this particular verse and focus specifically on the following definitons:

• A Thomistic soul is, as explained in Summa Q. 75, is immaterial, incorporeal, and subsistent. It is equated with pure intellect and a cause (reason-for-being) of mankind.

• A Restoration soul is the combination of spirit and body, full stop. It includes every property pertinent to both those modes of existence: spiritual and bodily (physical/natural).

To a Latter-day Saint or anyone familiar with Restoration scripture and ideas, it may be helpful to think of the spirit as somewhat similar to the Thomistic soul, but there are obvious distinctions which we will treat a little later.

Aquinas argues in Question 76 that:

[W]e must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This power is called the intellect.

It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in potentiality, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the "primary animate," as was said above (I:75:5).

Summa I, Q. 76, A. 1, Respondeo paragraphs 11-12

In plain English, Aquinas argues that the soul is not material at all, and is rather a higher and holier (nobler) state than does the matter of the physical body. This nobler thing is the "transcendent reality," to use Ferguson's terms if I understand him correctly, which animates the body and in which the body participates. This paradigm seems to track more closely with what Ferguson describes as the "[Aristotelian] insistence that in and through material being we encounter a transcendent reality that animates us with meaning." I hope it is clearer that Aristotle was not dealing with spiritual paradigms, but natural, and that Ferguson is more in line with Thomistic thought with respect to the premise of his article. And this line of thinking presents some serious issues for the Latter-day Saint.

Joseph Smith on Matter

Something of a Misrepresentation

Ferguson begins his reading on Joseph Smith's revelations on matter thusly:

This observed association between refined physical function and heightened intelligence is closely paralleled by Smith’s additional teaching that “spirit is matter, but it is more fine.”  This is typically interpreted to mean that “spirit” is an ultra-small substance—something like an extra-powdery particle that we could visibly see if only we had bionic-like visual resolution and subatomic vision. This, in my view, is a misguided understanding of what Smith was teaching about the metaphysics of spirit and spiritualized matter.

Ferguson, Spiritual Matter

This is something of a misrepresentation of a view and a lack of engagement with the entire context of the statement that "spirit is matter, but it is more fine." The entire scripture reads:

There is no such thing as immaterial matter. All spirit is matter, but it is more fine or pure, and can only be discerned by purer eyes;

We cannot see it; but when our bodies are purified we shall see that it is all matter.

D&C 131:7-8

The reason this statement is "typically interpreted to mean that 'spirit' is an ultra-small substance" is probably due to the full context of the scripture and the further statement of Joseph Smith as follows:

In tracing the thing to the foundation, and looking at it philosophically, we shall find a very material difference between the body and the spirit; the body is supposed to be organized matter, and the spirit, by many, is thought to be immaterial, without substance. With this latter statement we should beg leave to differ, and state the spirit is a substance; that it is material, but that it is more pure, elastic and refined matter than the body; that it existed before the body, can exist in the body; and will exist separate from the body, when the body will be mouldering in the dust; and will in the resurrection be again united with it.

Smith, Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, Section Four 1839-42, p.207

Ferguson fails to deal with the full context of Joseph Smith's statements dealing with matter and what that entails on his view, and therefore misrepresents what may be the prevailing view by oversimplifying it.

The above statement from Teachings directly refutes the hylomorphic paradigm set up by Aquinas in the Summa. We learn that Joseph believed that "the spirit is a substance," not subsistent, and has actual material that is "pure, elastic, and refined." More so than the [physical] body. He also asserts that this spiritual matter preexists the body, and exist in it, and does exist separate from it. Taken together with the revelations that God has a body (D&C 130:22), elements are eternal (D&C 93:33), and the Prophet's assertions that we are of the same kind as God (see Teachings, Section Six 1843-44, p.345), this situates the Prophet's view squarely away from Thomistic hylomorphism and into other live options. Sharing a view with Aristotle on eternity of matter does not mean that Joseph held a hylomorphic view, and to imply it is a little misguided and ignores the bulk of his teachings.

I would love to hear Dr. Ferguson's views on what a "pure, elastic, and refined" matter would look like, taking into account a more complete context of the Prophet's statements.

This will conclude Part 1, as this is already getting pretty long, and I feel I've said what needs to be said about hylomorphism. I also don't wish any particular ill will to Dr. Ferguson, and am more interested in a more thorough treatment of the ideas he presents. Stay tuned!

End Notes:

1. The linked article, cited below, has a similar feel to Blackburn in that Aquinas may have built upon ideas present in Aristotle. Though Aristotle did indeed argue that form and matter were coexistent, or better said that everything that existed was made of both things, he did not use a spiritual paradigm. That rightly belongs to Aquinas, as I'll discuss later.
   Kendall A. Fisher (2017) Thomas Aquinas on hylomorphism and the in-act principle, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 25:6, 1053-1072, DOI: 10.1080/09608788.2017.1300571

2. And if anyone is in any doubt as to Plato's significance, I think Alfred North Whitehead summed it up well in his book Process and Reality: "The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. I do not mean the systematic scheme of thought which scholars have doubtfully extracted from his writings. I allude to the wealth of general ideas scattered through them." (p. 39)

3. I think Blake Ostler terms it best in the following statement on the podcast Exploring Mormon Thought: "His religious vision was more like sparks flying from a flint wheel than a seamless fabric of postulates and premises. However, these sparks did not careen off the wheel at random; rather, they flashed in a common direction and in interesting patterns. His insights are like embers of thought deep in the heart seeking to catch fire, like fuel for creative contemplation." (click here for the episode, quote in show notes)
   
   This similar in my mind to what B. H. Roberts said of the Prophet: "[Joseph Smith] lived his life in crescendo, it grew in intensity and volume as he approached its close. Higher and still higher the inspiration of God directed his thoughts; bolder were his conceptions, and clearer his expositions of them. So far was he from being a “fallen prophet” in the closing months of his career, as apostates charged, that he grew stronger with each passing day; more impressive in weight of personal character, and charm of manner; for he preserved amid all the conflicts and trials through which he passed—until the shadows of impending death began to fall upon him in Carthage prison—the natural sweetness of his nature, and the intellectual playfulness characteristic of him from boyhood—so do not fallen prophets." ( B. H. Roberts, Introduction to Joseph Smith, Jr. History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day-Saints, 6:xli-xlii)